


One unhealthy commodities industry?

Implications for health policy in Scotland

Jeff Collin

Global Public Health Unit,
School of Social & Political Science
University of Edinburgh
jeff.collin@ed.ac.uk



UKCTAS

UK Centre for Tobacco & Alcohol Studies





FCTC

WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION
ON TOBACCO CONTROL



FOUNDATION FOR A
SMOKE-FREE WORLD



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
Debate: “the contribution of the Scotch whisky industry to the UK economy”

9th March 2016

References to health? 2

References to exports to India? 10

“Significant value is to be derived from increasing exports, especially looking at the massive potential of the emerging middle classes in the likes of India. The Scotch Whisky Association argues that taxing until the pips squeak sets a precedent for overseas markets. Indeed, Scotch faces a tariff of 150% in India.” – Michelle Thomson, Edinburgh West



NCDs: risk factors & unhealthy commodity industries

- Substantially preventable by addressing leading risk factors, mainly **tobacco use**, **unhealthy diet**, physical inactivity and the **harmful use of alcohol**.
- NCDs best understood as ‘industrial epidemics’ “driven at least in part by corporations and their allies who promote a product that is also a disease agent” - Jahiel & Babor 2008
- Inevitable tensions between economic interests of key actors and global health objectives
- Policy significance of managing conflict of interest



Policy (in)coherence, NCDs & global health

“extent to which conflicts between policy agendas are minimized and synergies maximized” – Blouin 2007



Strategic divide

Stark contrasts across NCD policies:

- WHO FCTC, **Art. 5.3**: “in setting and implementing their public health policies **Parties shall act to protect these policies from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry**”
- partnership & voluntary approaches to alcohol & nutrition
- Participation of alcohol & ultra-processed food producers in WHO reform & Global Coordination Mechanism for NCDs

United Kingdom's revised guidelines for overseas posts on support to the tobacco industry

December 2013

5. Posts should limit interactions with the tobacco industry, including any person or organisation that is likely to be working to further the interests of the tobacco industry. In the event that interactions with the tobacco industry are necessary, these should be conducted with maximum transparency to demonstrate our compliance with the FCTC.
6. Posts must **not**:
 - Be involved in activities with the specific purpose of promoting the sale of tobacco or tobacco related products (including promotional goods);
 - Lobby against any local Administration's policies that are aimed at improving public health; or
 - Engage with foreign governments on behalf of the tobacco industry, except in cases where local policies could be considered protectionist or discriminatory.

Government support for alcohol industry: promoting exports, jeopardising global health?

Successive UK governments have actively supported the expansion of alcohol exports. **Jeff Collins**, **Emma Johnson**, and **Sarah Hill** explore the implicit tensions between national economic interests and global health goals *BMJ* 2014;348:g3648 doi: 10.1136/bmj.g3648

The logo for 'thebmj' is displayed in white lowercase letters on a blue rounded rectangular background.

- Facilitating foreign direct investment in emerging markets
- Promoting privatisation in SSA
- Securing tariff reductions
- Challenging regulation under WTO agreements
- Promoting industry interests in trade negotiations
- Providing access to development aid

Strategic similarities across tobacco, alcohol & ultra-processed food industries



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RESEARCH ARTICLE

How Does the Tobacco Industry Attempt to Influence Marketing Regulations? A Systematic Review

Emily Savell, Anna B. Gilmore, Gary Fooks

Published: February 5, 2014 • <http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0087389>



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Review

How does the alcohol industry attempt to influence marketing regulations? A systematic review

[Emily Savell](#), [Gary Fooks](#), [Anna B. Gilmore](#)

First published: 27 August 2015 [Full publication history](#)

“There are considerable commonalities between tobacco and alcohol industry political activity, with differences due potentially to differences in policy contexts and perceived industry legitimacy.”

A proposed approach to systematically identify and monitor the corporate political activity of the food industry with respect to public health using publicly available information

M. Mialon¹, B. Swinburn^{1,2} and G. Sacks¹

obesity reviews

doi: 10.1111/obr.12289

– Savell et al 2015

Examining interlocking directorates


“An interlocking directorate occurs when a person affiliated with one organization sits on the board of directors of another organization. The causes and consequences of this seemingly minor, even innocuous event, have been the source of extensive debate since ... the early twentieth century. Relatively simple to identify in publicly available information from highly reliable sources, interlocks have become **the primary indicator of interfirm network ties.**” – Mizruchi, 1996

Strategic value of directors

- directors are chosen to address priorities of specific firms
- offer benefits including:
 - access to expertise and advice
 - enhancing communications with external organisations
 - informing strategic development
 - aligning with other firms, within and across sectors
 - securing access or support re: policymakers
 - enhancing legitimacy.

(Mizruchi 1996; Carroll & Sapincki 2011; Hillman 2005)

Susan Murray, Pernod-Ricard & Imperial Tobacco 2010 -14




Interlocking directorates in food industry: Quantitative analysis (very preliminary)

- Analysing boards of world's top 6 food & beverage companies as identified by Forbes
- Nestle, Coca Cola, Pepsi Co, Unilever, Mondelez International and Danone.
- Far more extensive links with charities, health & development agencies than top 6 alcohol or tobacco companies

Sector	Number of linkages
Health and development	130
Political elites	45
Other food companies	22
Alcohol	10
Tobacco	0

Source: K McPherson, dissertation, U. of Edinburgh 2015


Regional Contribution to Annual Revenue



Source: SABMiller annual reports
 (data compiled by Dara Oyewolo, 2015)



Interlocking directorates: Tobacco, alcohol & political elite





One unhealthy commodities industry?



BRITISH AMERICAN
TOBACCO



PHILIP MORRIS
INTERNATIONAL



Altria



Merging alcohol giants threaten global health

Alcohol has comparable health risks to tobacco but none of its pariah status



BMJ 2015;351:h6087 doi: 10.1136/bmj.h6087 (Published 17 November 2015)

Jeff Collin *professor of global health policy*, Sarah E Hill *senior lecturer*, Katherine E Smith *reader*

- 1/3 global beer sales; leader in 24 of 30 biggest markets
- driven by prospects for expansion in developing countries
- AB InBev identify complementary geographical strengths
 - emphasis on Africa “a critical driver of growth for the combined company”
- world’s fastest growing region for alcoholic drinks 2013-18
 - “exploiting Africa’s low per capita consumption of beer”
 - targeting low income consumers (Euromonitor 2015)

Questions

- Can WHO (or Scottish Government) differentiate “Big Tobacco” from “Big Food, Big Soda or Big Alcohol”?
- What implications arise from multiple links (strategic, financial, political, & supply chain) across global industries?
- What does this imply for public health policy and advocacy in Scotland?

Beyond silos: implications for policy agenda

- **Lesson learning:** conflict of interest, supply side
- **Shared opportunities for policy innovation?**
 - Tackling outlet density; revisiting the public health levy?; pursuing 'Polluter pays' approaches
 - Sustainable Development Goals & commercial determinants of ill health
- **Mutual threats?**
 - Trade and investment agreements (and Brexit)
 - Corporate (mis)appropriation of harm reduction
- **Managing 'competition'** and tensions across issue areas

Innovation in Scotland



Cross Party Group on Improving Scotland's Health: 2021 and Beyond

- focuses on preventing and reducing NCDs
- promoting policy coherence
- underpinned by serious attention to conflict of interest





Innovation in Scotland

How do anti-poverty stakeholders view tobacco control?

How could greater understanding and collaboration between health and anti-poverty interests be evolved?




A NATION WITH (a bit more?) AMBITION




“We will ... explore how food outlets in the vicinity of schools can be better controlled”

- and alcohol?



ADDRESSING AND MANAGING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
IN THE PLANNING AND DELIVERY OF NUTRITION PROGRAMMES AT COUNTRY LEVEL

Regulating unhealthy commodity industries: major opportunity



- Promote coherent approach across NCDs (Collin 2012)
- Redress “reluctance to tackle the more structural drivers of change” (Hawkes 2006)
- Unhealthy commodity producers as “modifiable social determinants of health”: regulation key to reducing inequalities (Freudenberg & Galea 2008)
- Opportunity to develop effective upstream interventions, shifting focus towards prevention